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STATUS: Complete YEAR: 2018 TOPIC AREA: Public transit, land use, and urban mobility Vehicles and infrastructure CENTER: PSR

Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Ridesharing

Project Summary

Funding source: Caltrans

Funding amount: $100,000

Contract number: 65A0674 TO 004

Start and end dates: 02/01/2019 to 03/31/2020

 

Project description

A set of nascent technologies focusing on cost-sharing transportation systems such as ridesharing/carsharing have recently emerged. The objective of this research is to develop cost-sharing mechanisms to aid providers of one such service, ridesharing, to determine suitable prices for passengers sharing a trip for this type of service. While there has a been a rich history of using optimization models to determine routes for these types of services, there has been little research in determining the suitable cost to a ridesharing passenger, especially those that take into consideration the special incentives for ridesharing. One such special feature/incentive is the use of special links in the roadway, namely, the increasing use of High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes and reduced toll rates for high occupancy vehicles on many roads and bridges. The first (optimization) and second (cost-sharing) problems are highly interrelated since the routes and schedules of the vehicles determine the operating cost that needs to be shared. Conversely, the cost-sharing mechanism imposes constraints on the routes and schedules that need to be optimized, for example, because the fares of passengers should not exceed their fare quotes. While the routing optimization problem has received considerable attention in the literature, the cost-sharing problem has largely been neglected and will be the focus of this research. One crucial component of a cost sharing transportation system is the allocation of costs and/or savings to each participant in the system. Without a model to allocate costs and/or savings to each participant in the rideshare, drivers have no basis to allocate their cost to the other passengers, thus having less incentive to participate.

 

P.I. NAME & ADDRESS

Maged Dessouky
Dean's Professor and Chair, Daniel J. Epstein Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
3715 McClintock Ave.
Ethel Percy Andrus Gerontology Center (GER) 206ALos Angeles, CA 90089-0193
United States
[email protected]